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ABSTRACT 
 
Introduced by a neoliberal reformist government and expanded by the incumbent 
developmentalist administration, the uniqueness of Bolivia‟s universal social pension 
scheme goes beyond its domestic political architecture and implementation. This 
social policy measure challenges the dominant model of conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs) that has recently prevailed throughout Latin America, in addition to 
contradicting the recommendations of many international financial and development 
institutions who have favoured targeted social assistance as a means to address 
poverty and inequality in middle and low-income countries. 
 
This paper seeks to understand what has sustained this controversial social security 
measure for over a decade. In doing so, it concludes that grassroots‟ pressure and 
popular participation have played an influential role in the evolution and perpetuation 
of Bolivia‟s universal social pension scheme. This development could have interesting 
implications for the formulation of future social policy in the region and may possibly 
provide credence to a more participatory approach to social policy-making as opposed 
to the traditional top-down and clientelistic models of recent decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The neoliberal economic policies that were implemented in Bolivia during the latter 
part of the 1980s led to a difficult period of adjustment for many Bolivians, of which 
elderly citizens constituted a particularly vulnerable group. In an effort to balance 
soaring fiscal deficits, social spending was reigned in by the neoliberal reformist 
government, to the extent that state-sponsored safety nets were virtually non-existent. 
The persistence of high informality in the labour force and a shift to defined 
contribution pension schemes also precluded many workers approaching retirement 
age from any sort of formal pension scheme to provide for their needs in old-age. 
Thus when the Bono Solidario or Bonosol, a non-contributory social pension benefit, 
was introduced by the administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 1997 it was 
welcomed by many elderly Bolivians who, in the absence of a pension or personal 
savings, faced an old age characterised by impoverishment, marginalisation and 
indignity.  
 
The Bonosol was funded by the proceeds gained from the privatisation of state 
enterprises and paid out from the Collective Capitalisation Fund (Fondo de 
Capitalización Colectiva, FCC), a move that was viewed by many as a „sweetener‟ to 
the destabilising effects of the macroeconomic reforms (Crabtree, 2009). Both within 
Bolivia‟s borders and further afield the Bonosol caused controversy from the outset. 
Although it allowed for the transfer of state resources to elderly Bolivians in the form 
of an annual payment, its promulgation under the cloak of privatisation raised 
concerns in Bolivia that the country was undermining its future capacity to generate 
revenue for its social and economic development. The lack of consultation with 
grassroots organisations also led to certain shortcomings with the scheme. 
 
Social policy experts also questioned the financial sustainability and effectiveness of 
the universal nature of the social policy measure, arguing that means-tested social 
assistance programmes or conditional cash-transfers (CCTs) would be more beneficial 
for the most indigent sectors of society and a state encumbered by fiscal deficits 
(Leach, 1998: 3). Issues surrounding its financial viability would remain at the 
forefront of the controversy surrounding the Bonosol throughout its highly politicised 
lifespan.  
 
The beginning of the 21
st
 century in Bolivia witnessed growing scenes of political 
turmoil and unrest, with many governments facing a crisis of legitimacy due to poor 
state-society relations. The rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) political 
party culminated in the December 2005 election of Bolivia‟s first indigenous 
president, Evo Morales, whose developmentalist administration inherited the Bonosol 
scheme in a state of financial disarray. Sources of funding from the FCC were 
exhausted leading to doubts over whether the Bonosol would be continued.  
 
This provoked a strong response from civil society representatives and elderly groups 
who were concerned at the possibility of losing this social benefit. Making use of 
newly-opened channels for political participation and representation, elderly citizens 
gathered together to lobby the government in an effort to ensure the continuation of 
the scheme. Civil society organisations also assisted representatives of elderly 
Bolivians, providing capacity-building training so that representatives could create a 
coherent and widely supported platform from which they were able to place demands 
directly on the MAS administration and ensure the voices of ordinary citizens were 
heard.  
 
Under pressure from elderly groups and civil society representatives the eventual 
response of the government was to discontinue the Bonosol and propose the 
introduction of a more generous and expansive universal social benefit to elderly 
Bolivians entitled “La Renta Dignidad”, [LRD, (Dignity Pension)]. The benefit is 
currently funded by the proceeds from the recent nationalisation of the hydrocarbons 
industry or the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos, 
IDH). However this entailed a cut in revenues received by the various departments, 
municipalities and universities, a move that unsurprisingly caused widespread anger 
and resistance amongst these groups. Despite these vicissitudes however La Renta 
Dignidad was controversially passed into law in late 2007 and so began a new chapter 
in Bolivia‟s universal pension scheme.  
 
1.2 Central Hypothesis 
Since its inception in 1997 Bolivia‟s universal pension scheme has endured a 
turbulent history and questions surrounding its financial sustainability, its 
effectiveness as a social policy measure and questions of ownership have been 
commonplace. How it has survived under the stewardship of both neoliberal reformist 
and developmentalist administrations and the wider profound social and political 
restructuring that Bolivia has undergone in recent times is an intriguing development 
that warrants further exploration.  
 
Consequently, an attempt to understand what has sustained this universal social 
pension benefit forms the main impetus behind this research paper. The genesis and 
continuation of the scheme has been attributed to a wide range of determinants 
including macroeconomic factors such as the adoption of neoliberal economic 
ideology or political and electoral considerations on behalf of its architects. There are 
also suggestions that it is simply an effective measure of state social assistance and 
that any attempts to downsize the scheme to means-tested target beneficiaries would 
induce a backlash from recipients who depend on it. These are important 
considerations and will be addressed throughout the paper. 
 
However, as a result of extensive engagement with existing secondary literature and 
fieldwork undertaken in Bolivia, this research concludes that grassroots‟ pressure and 
popular participation have played a particularly influential role in the evolution and 
perpetuation of Bolivia‟s universal social pension scheme. Specifically, the research 
focuses on the crucial transition period from the discontinuation of the Bonosol to the 
introduction of the Renta Dignidad programme in 2007 and it will highlight how the 
demands exerted by elderly Bolivians and civil society representatives, through 
improved participation and representation, mass demonstrations and lobbying, have 
ensured that this social policy measure has been sustained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Relevance 
Contemporary social policy design and implementation remains a highly topical issue 
in Latin America, particularly as many countries continue to steer themselves away 
from the predominant focus on macroeconomic policy that prevailed during the latter 
part of the twentieth century. The detrimental social effects that neoliberal economic 
policy had on many countries in the region has required that the state play a more 
active role in providing safety-nets and social assistance to their citizens (Kirby, 2009: 
135). Coupled with the focus on poverty eradication and social development that 
emerged from international development institutions and the objectives of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), state social assistance remains at the 
forefront of policy-making in the region and a very visible and important part of state-
society relations. (Barrientos et al, 2008: 759) 
 
Furthermore, social policy in Latin America has typically been designed in a top-
down manner and it has often formed the basis of clientelistic relationships between 
the state and its citizens. This situation has often resulted in even the most well-
intentioned social benefit programmes failing, due to a lack of legitimacy and an 
inability to directly address the needs of target beneficiaries. In developing countries 
such as Bolivia, as the theory surrounding participatory development would suggest, 
consultation and involvement of target beneficiaries is an important aspect of 
designing effective social policy, particularly as the resources available to 
governments to conduct research and impact evaluations can be limited. Therefore if 
stakeholder participation and influence can be observed in the events that have 
sustained Bolivia‟s social pension benefit then this could reflect an example of a shift 
to a more participatory or bottom-up approach to social policy formulation.  
 
1.4 Justification 
Most of the academic literature surrounding Bolivia‟s universal pension scheme has 
been influenced by wider regional social policy considerations such as the 
effectiveness of universal welfare programmes versus methods of targeted social 
assistance. Consequently much of the literature has concentrated predominantly on 
evaluating the design of the social pension benefit and its impacts on beneficiaries 
(Aponte et al, 2007; Burke, 2001). Yet despite the controversy surrounding the 
Bolivian universal social pension benefit there has been relatively little investigation 
into the processes and events that have influenced its evolution, as Katharina Müller 
highlighted in a recent article on the political economy of the Bonosol in the 
International Journal of Social Welfare (Müller, 2009). Consequently, by focusing on 
the political sociology behind the controversial genesis, development and continuation 
of Bolivia‟s non-contributory social pension scheme this paper seeks to add to a 
hitherto neglected area of research in the literature. 
 
Finally, evidence of popular participation in Bolivia could provide important lessons 
for social policy-makers in the future - if grassroots organisation can be observed to 
be successfully partaking in the social policy formulation process then this could 
herald an introduction of social assistance programmes that more effectively address 
the needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups. Wider impacts could include the 
creation of social partnerships between state and non-state actors that could lay the 
foundations for future social and economic development and an improvement of state-
society relations. Indeed, in countries such as Bolivia where democratic governance 
has struggled to embed itself following years of military dictatorships and elite 
political domination, evidence of political participation and representation could also 
signify a strengthening of accountable and responsive governmental institutions.  
1.5 Methodology and Structure 
This paper will make extensive use of the existing literature on Latin American social 
policy with a view to providing a pertinent context in which to base the research. 
Secondary sources will be consulted to highlight and reflect upon the predominant 
means of state social assistance throughout the twentieth century in Latin America.  
Reference will also be made to the effects that macroeconomic restructuring had on 
the region and especially the impacts that neoliberal reforms had on social policy 
design and visibility. This exercise will represent the main thrust of the second 
chapter.  
 
Having established a pertinent context to the research, chapter three will then review 
the current debates in the literature surrounding methods of participatory development 
as this will be useful when it comes to analysing the impact of non-state actors in the 
evolution of Bolivia‟s social pension scheme later in the paper. Chapter three will also 
make reference to the New Social Policy that emerged in the wake of the neoliberal 
economic restructuring in Latin America an the chapter will close by casting an eye 
over the predominantly means-tested social assistance schemes that consequently 
emerged in Latin America with the objective of highlighting the uniqueness of 
Bolivia‟s universal social pension scheme in this period.   
 
Chapter four will analyse the period in which the Bonosol was implemented in 
Bolivia and review the early opportunities available to civil society and grassroots 
organisations to participate in national and local policy formulation in this period. 
This chapter will therefore review the impact of the Ley de Participación Popular 
(Popular Participation Law) on civil society in Bolivia and how it helped lay the 
foundations for future involvement of marginalised and poorly represented groups. 
Chapter five will present the results of research carried out in Bolivia through 
interviews and complimentary secondary research. This section will detail the 
influence that civil society groups had on the evolution of Bolivia‟s universal pension 
scheme. In particular it will show how training assistance provided by civil society 
groups facilitated the emergence of cohesive elderly representative and interest groups 
that were ultimately able to lobby the government and make their voices heard in the 
policymaking process. 
 
By way of conclusion chapter six will summarise the material presented in this paper 
and relate the results to the context of traditional social policy formulation in Latin 
America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIAL POLICY ANTECEDENTS 
 
This chapter seeks to provide a context to social policy in Latin America so as to 
illustrate the uniqueness of recent developments in Bolivia. To do so the chapter will 
briefly trace the evolution of social policy in the region to show how social assistance 
measures in Latin America have typically been construed in a top-down and 
clientelistic manner. This section will also review the impact that neoliberal economic 
policy had on state social assistance in the late twentieth century and the internal and 
external responses to the detrimental social effects of neoliberal economic policy.  
 
2.1 The Emergence of Social Policy in Latin America 
The provision of social assistance by governments in Latin America has endured a 
chequered history throughout the twentieth century, with state welfare varying greatly 
in its design, reach, sustainability and ultimately, its effectiveness in addressing the 
needs of citizens. As early as the First World War, „pioneering‟ states, particularly in 
the Southern Cone, began to extend social assistance to citizens. In the following 
decades Latin America saw a preoccupation with import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) models of economic growth and with growing employment opportunities many 
countries sought to develop social insurance provisions and employment protection 
(Barrientos et al, 2008: 760). Argentina, Chile and Uruguay were early examples of 
countries who introduced employment protection and social insurance schemes that 
targeted the growing and politically active labour force, particularly in urban areas.  
 
Recognising the electoral benefit of conferring welfare assistance to citizens, aspiring 
political leaders during this period, such as Juan Peron in Argentina, closely aligned 
themselves with labour groups that were swelling Latin America‟s urban centres. 
Notwithstanding the political rewards, social and economic development  
considerations also fired aspirations to provide universal access to education and 
healthcare amongst many developmentalist states in Latin America. However, those 
outside the formal employment sector were often neglected and a focus on male 
breadwinners and urban workers meant that rural workers and women were often 
excluded from these early social protection measures (ibid.: 760). 
 
Under the leadership of democratic developmentalist states in the 1950s and 1960s 
Latin America achieved decent progress in relation to educational achievement and 
health indicators. However the ISI model of growth was experiencing stagnation as 
governments were unable to generate enough revenue from inward-looking 
development production to fund their reliance on external capital and imports. 
Generous subsidies and protection of domestic industries also contributed to soaring 
fiscal deficits in many cases. This situation forced governments to borrow from 
abroad so that they could sustain both the ISI model of growth and associated social 
benefits, but increasing indebtedness led to disillusionment amongst many sectors of 
society. Seizing upon the opportunity, military personnel engineered takeovers of 
state institutions to the extent that most of Latin America was under military rule by 
the 1970s.  
 
Unsurprisingly, state preoccupation with social policy under military administrations 
was greatly undermined as state-society relations were more concerned with 
repression than social assistance. However the military dictatorships proved no more 
fiscally astute, and with a sea of petrodollars flooding international capital markets 
these administrations continued to borrow excessively from abroad amid declining 
income from domestic economic output. Most countries were ultimately unable to pay 
off these loans and the region faced a debt crisis in the 1980s which resulted in a 
series of extensive economic and social policy reforms throughout the continent.  
 
2.2 What the ‘Lost Decade’ meant for Social Policy in Latin America  
In response to the soaring fiscal deficits and hyper-inflation that plagued many Latin 
American countries a series of macroeconomic structural adjustment policies were 
prescribed for Latin American governments to implement. The promise of financial 
bail-outs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was made contingent on the 
implementation of these policies by governments throughout the region (Naím, 2000: 
92). Known also as the Washington Consensus reforms they were designed and 
formulated by neoliberal economists abroad whose professed goal was to reduce the 
expenditure of the state and balance the books. However the „encouragement‟ by 
Washington for governments to adopt policies of trade liberalisation, privatisation of 
state enterprises and an opening of domestic markets led to questions been raised 
about whose interests these policies were truly benefiting. More pertinently, the 
preoccupation of neoliberal reformist governments with fiscal expenditure led to 
severe cutbacks in social spending which was subordinated to the chief policy goal of 
economic recovery. However in countries such as Bolivia the structural adjustment 
policies that were implemented did not achieve economic growth as envisaged, and 
without the availability of social safety nets many citizens fell into abject poverty. 
 
Indeed the post-adjustment recession that Bolivia endured had very detrimental social 
impacts on the country. The GDP per capita fell every year from 1986 until 1989 and 
unemployment rose due to the downsizing of large employers such as state mining 
companies and the public sector service. Those who were lucky enough to retain 
employment faced a depreciation in their wages - the hyperinflation in 1985 led to the 
real urban minimum wage being cut by 60%. Rates of poverty and income 
distribution also worsened in the period after the implementation of the Washington 
Consensus reforms, with levels of urban poverty and the Gini coefficient 
measurement of inequality both rising between 1986 and 1989 (Morley, 1995: 181/2). 
Thus at a time when state social assistance was desperately needed by the majority of 
the population, the government failed to provide for its citizens. Indeed a shortcoming 
in the general provision of social assistance in Latin America, as Hicks and Wodon 
have highlighted (2001: 93), is that the nature of social spending in Latin America has 
often been pro-cyclical as opposed to counter-cyclical. The result of this phenomenon 
is that spending on social protection is often cut back during periods of 
macroeconomic instability when governments need to reign in their expenditure 
(Molyneux, 2008: 778). 
 
The situation encountered by many Bolivians was not unique and poverty and 
inequality rates increased the length and breadth of the continent during the 1990s. 
The predictions of strong economic growth and employment opportunities articulated 
by the architects of the Washington Consensus reforms did not materialise and its 
supporters were forced to acknowledge the adverse social impacts of these policies. In 
response to Latin America‟s „lost decade‟ and the demands of citizens, governments 
realised the need to provide social protection to their citizens, a decision also 
influenced by the growing focus on poverty eradication and social assistance by 
development institutions worldwide.  
 
2.3 Internal and External Responses to the ‘Lost Decade’ 
Amongst the international development and financial institutions there was an 
acknowledgement of the need for social protection measures in the wake of growing 
poverty throughout the region (Cornia et al, 1987; Stiglitz, 2002: 2). International 
Financial Insitutions such as the World Bank acknowledged their role in supporting 
the disastrous structural adjustment policies that had such terrible social outcomes in 
Latin America and they began to champion the role that social policy could play in 
providing not just in protecting citizens but also in actively tackling poverty 
throughout the region (World Bank, 2001, x). The publication of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report in 1990 also signalled a 
shift in approaches to development policy and poverty alleviation. These new research 
publications and policy approaches reflected the emerging consensus by foreign donor 
governments and international NGOs on the need for social policy assistance. The 
result was, as Gough et al note (2004: 1), that the improvement of human welfare 
became an explicit goal of international development discourse and policy.  
 
In tandem with external developments and debates, marginalised and vulnerable 
groups in Latin America were beginning to demand better means of social assistance 
at a domestic level in response to the region‟s encounter with the forces of economic 
globalisation. Taking advantage of newly available democratic channels and avenues 
after the fall of military rule in the region, re-enfranchised citizens, civil society 
groups and social movements increased the pressure on their governments to create 
adeqaute social policy measures to help moderate the declining standards of living 
and poverty faced by many sectors of society. Reliant on popular support to reach 
office and legitimise their power, increasingly governments in countries such as 
Bolivia had to answer directly to the needs and demands of their citizens. 
Indeed these events within Bolivia and elsewhere reflected a „double movement‟ as 
political economist Karl Polanyi termed it. Polanyi suggested that during processes of 
economic modernisation and the development of liberal capitalism, the economy 
disembeds itself from the constraints of social relations or responsibilities that prevent 
it from moving forward. Polanyi cites the example of Britain during the early 
nineteenth century to argue that capitalism extended insecurity through a process of 
disembedding the economy from society and the commodification of labour. He also 
notes however that during the rest of the century „society‟ protected itself by re-
embedding social relations, mainly via state social intervention (Gough & Wood, 
2004: 4). Thus the parallels with the situation that Bolivia underwent during the 
Washington Consensus reforms, and afterwards with the increasing demands of 
society for increased social assistance from the state, are strikingly similar and would 
help lay the foundations for the emergence of a new approach to social policy. 
 
The „lost decade‟ in Latin America was therefore characterised by insecurity, poverty 
and marginalisation for many citizens as household coping mechanisms became 
strained and employment opportunities dried up. In tandem with domestic and 
international developments this situation forced governments to reconsider their 
decision to reduce public expenditure and social assistance. Thus after years in the 
background of government considerations, social policy re-emerged to become an 
important and visible aspect of state-society relations with modifications to its design, 
reach and implementation.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE  
THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 
 
This chapter seeks to trace the emergence of the New Social Policy in Latin America 
in the 1990s and review the concepts of participation and empowerment that were 
increasingly been advocated by development practitioners. It will also detail how 
mean-tested and targeted assistance become the predominant manifestation of the 
New Social Policy as it was implemented on the ground throughout Latin America, in 
contrast to Bolivia‟s universal social pension scheme. 
 
3.1 Participation, Empowerment and the New Social Policy. 
The fragility or inefficiency of early measures of social assistance was exposed by 
their inability to protect citizens during the 1980s period of economic uncertainty 
when they were most needed. (Molyneux, 2008: 778). The „lost decade‟ in Latin 
America therefore marked a watershed for social policy design in Latin America and 
developments throughout the continent and further afield marked the emergence of a 
New Social Policy. Of particular relevance is that the New Social Policy embodied 
the principles of participation, empowerment and co-responsibility and promoted 
mean-tested or targeted welfare assistance as emphasised by the World Bank‟s New 
Poverty Agenda and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Indeed, civic 
involvement was expected to build a broad consensus for sound macroeconomic 
policies and reforms so that there would be fewer policy reversals and a greater 
impact on poverty (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2003: 685). 
 
A World Bank report of 1996 defined participation as “a process through which 
stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the 
decisions and resources that affect them” (World Bank, 1996: 3). However Molyneux 
argues that participation was not a new concept, having been introduced to the sphere 
of development around the 1970s, but it only moved into mainstream development 
practise in the aftermath of the „lost decade‟ in Latin America. It has been suggested 
that participatory approaches can facilitate more responsive and legitimate initiatives 
for the benefit of target groups; 
 
“Participation also serves to provide development projects with 
some measure of legitimacy on the assumption that those involved 
have helped to shape the direction and outcome. Such „people-
centred‟ development has generally been welcomed by NGOs who 
had been pressing for decades for greater attention to the grassroots 
in the formulation of policy. These ideas have also inspired the 
model of demand-led assistance.” 
 
(Molyneux, 2008: 782) 
 
Citizens often struggle to participate individually in policy-making, particularly at a 
national level, as participation is a time and resource consuming affair and decision-
making processes can often take place in centres that are geographically far-removed 
from citizens. Thus, participation often occurs collectively or indirectly through 
representatives or civil society groups that will speak on behalf of stakeholders 
(Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2003: 686). However, it may not always be the case that 
interest groups truly speak on behalf of those they purport to represent. This can often 
be the case where a small community organisation grows to a national level and 
encompasses members from diverse social, economic and ethnic backgrounds. 
Conversely, where there exists a strong cohesive relationship amongst citizen 
members who are supported by representatives that can articulate a unified stance 
then the possibilities for influencing policy-making processes are greatly enhanced. 
 
Opportunities for civil society participation are further improved in democratic or 
democratising countries as they allow for groups to organise and participate freely and 
there is more likely to be both official and unofficial political and governing structures 
that facilitate active participation through consultation, information sharing, 
collaboration and lobbying. Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith argue that citizens are more 
likely to influence policies once they are in place and have had time to digest their 
impacts and that it would not be common for civil society groups to have the last 
word in policy formulation. However, for successful empowerment and engagement 
with the policy-making process, opportunities for civil society to engage and 
participate greatly depend on is the willingness of government officials to not just 
listen, but to also act on, alternative policy proposals (ibid: 688) 
 
The principle of empowerment enjoyed an almost symbiotic relationship with the 
concept of participation and was also closely aligned with the New Social Policy. As 
Molyneux & Lazar point out it became a very useful tool for NGOs, social 
movements and other interest groups to lobby on behalf marginalised or 
disadvantaged groups (2003: 59). Support for the concept of empowerment was 
influenced by the increasingly prevalent and successful use of rights-based 
approaches to development and the advancements made by NGOs and women‟s 
organisations in the 1980s. They were seen as instruments by which citizens could 
hold the state accountable to existing legal provisions and international covenants or 
campaign governments to enshrine social and economic rights in national legislation. 
Instead of the traditional methods of social policy which made beneficiaries inactive 
recipients of charitable assistance, there was a drive to empower citizens so that they 
would become stakeholders with interests and responsibilities and active participants 
in the policy process. The hope was; that the empowerment of disadvantaged citizens 
through participation would allow them a voice and presence in decision-making 
processes that affect their lives and allow them to engage in the setting of priorities for 
development projects and policies (Molyneux, 2008: 783).  
 
The Right to Social Development was inextricably tied to the objectives of the New 
Social Policy and was thus employed as a platform by which NGOs or grassroots 
movements could demand increased social protection measures from governments. 
Indeed social development became an apparent strategic objective of national 
government aspirations in Bolivia too as a speech by the Bolivian Minister of Human 
Development in 2000 suggests; 
 
Social development, conceived as sustainable human development, 
should consider individuals as the central objective of development 
and seek their betterment as individuals as well as achieve a 
significant improvement in their well-being. Hence, social 
development should make individuals the main actors of this 
process. The active participation of individuals in all aspects of 
decision-making is a key basis for social development. 
 
(Melgar, 2000) 
 
The reality on the ground would often differ to the affirmations of government 
officials eager to impress potential donors while addressing a world stage. However 
by articulating intentions that sought to make individuals the main actors in their 
development this meant that the government was opening the door to increased 
demands from grassroots and popular organisations in the future. 
 
3.2 The Dominant Models of the New Social Policy in Practise 
In many cases early responses to the demands for more effective social policy in Latin 
America proved inadequate - both at incorporating participatory methods into their 
design and achieving their ultimate goal of reducing poverty. Emergency Social 
Funds were set up in countries such as Bolivia to provide workfare schemes but these 
proved ineffective and highly divisive owing to the discretionary targeting of certain 
groups. The Social Investment Fund that followed was innovative in that it tried to 
focus on participatory and demand-driven initiatives however it too ultimately failed 
to address the end-goal of tackling widespread poverty and vulnerability faced by 
many Bolivians (Barrientos & Santibáñez, 2009: 7). As a result scepticism about the 
feasibility of participatory ideals at the operational level of many development 
agencies emerged while others suggested that that citizens cannot understand or 
contribute to complex policy making processes at a national level even if they had the 
opportunity (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2003: 686).  
 
Yet certain Latin American governments did respond to the challenges posed to them 
by introducing innovative and progressive social policy measures. In many cases 
these programmes were directly administered by government bodies who saw the 
need for an active role if prevalent issues of poverty and marginalisation were to be 
successfully tackled. As governments were still conscious of the need to strike a 
balance between state income and public expenditure, targeted methods of social 
assistance became commonplace throughout the region with countries such as Mexico 
and Brazil pioneering the way with CCT schemes. By the late 1990s targeted anti-
poverty programmes were established by the Brazilian and Mexican governments, 
with the trend spreading to the rest of the continent (Barrientos et al, 2008: 761). In 
Chile, the government expanded their existing social assistance scheme to an 
integrated anti-poverty scheme called Chile Solidario that targeted the most indigent 
sectors of society. This means-tested method of social assistance incorporated 
psychosocial support, cash subsidies and provided access to healthcare and training so 
as to facilitate the social integration of poor families in Chile.  
 
These methods of social assistance contrasted with previous measures of social policy 
in the region as they directly targeted the most indigent sectors of society. 
Furthermore, whereas previous social policy had been directed towards the formal 
labour force, which were predominantly men, these new schemes were more 
maternalistic in their focus and they targeted households instead of individuals. As 
the case of Brazil‟s Bolsa Escola programme highlights, it sought to increase and 
retain children‟s access to health and education by targeting mothers and their 
children together through making cash-transfers conditional on children‟s attendance 
at school and primary health care clinics.  
 
To ensure that social assistance programmes do actually reach those who need it the 
most, extensive research is required to identify the most indigent sectors of society, 
which governments often feel is not worthwhile considering the large amount of time 
and resources required to do so, and the relatively short amount of time democratic 
administrations have in power (Müller, 2009: 169). Furthermore, the nature of means-
testing means that a line has to be drawn to identify the needy from the non-needy. In 
many cases those just above the line are only marginally better-off while those below 
the line often have limited interest in crossing the threshold as it will entail a loss in 
benefits. Universal schemes address many of these issues by, ostensibly at least, 
including all citizens and excluding none. This also helps to avoid stigmatisation that 
can be associated with targeted social assistance. However with a larger number of 
citizens to maintain payments and assistance to, even the most developed economies 
in the world struggle to financially maintain universal schemes of social welfare. 
Legitimate concerns over the quality of services provided at a universal level have 
also been raised, with many suggesting that limited resources constrict the ability of 
providers to supply a high quality of services. 
 
Despite the progressive nature of targeted schemes like Chile Solidario that have been 
lauded for its conceptualisation of poverty as more than just economic exclusion, 
there are concerns that its formulation has reportedly consolidated social policy 
formulation in the hands of technical experts, providing few opportunities for citizen 
participation or consultation in either defining or seeking solutions to problems faced 
by beneficiaries (Palma & Urzúa, 2005: 6). There were also questions been asked of 
the intended objectives and commitment of many of these anti-poverty or social 
assistance schemes that were rolled out owing to the political and economic contexts 
which surrounded their launch. Many of the schemes were introduced, not because of 
social policy considerations, but as an attempt to win over support from citizens and 
workers angered by the large-scale privatisation of state utilities and the 
transformation of the country‟s economy that had ruined livelihoods, as was the case 
with Alberto Fujimori in Peru.  
 
Thus certain social assistance schemes that were rolled out in Latin America during 
the 1990s were done so on a weak foundation of legitimacy for the population or 
beneficiaries and in certain cases social policy remained very clientelistic as the case 
of Peru explicitly shows. The same would apply in Bolivia - the administration of 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada also announced the introduction of the Bonosol social 
pension benefit in an effort to diffuse opposition to the privatisation of state owned 
enterprises and existing pension schemes as the following chapter will now explore. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EARLY GRASSROOTS PARTICIPATION 
 
This chapter will detail the introduction of the Bonosol social pension benefit in light 
of the emerging New Social Policy paradigm in Latin America and review the 
opportunities available for Bolivian citizens to participate in policy design in this 
particular period, particularly at the national level. In doing so, it will analyse the 
impact of the Ley de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Law) and the 
„National Dialogue‟ process at the time of the Bonosol‟s implementation to see what 
early opportunities existed for grassroots organisations to influence policy formulation 
in Bolivia.  
 
4.1 The Introduction of the Bolivian Universal Social Pension Scheme 
The ill-effects of the „lost decade‟ lead to widespread outrage amongst many 
marginalised and disadvantaged groups in Bolivia during the 1990s. A cut in social 
expenditure and the lack of employment opportunities affected vast swathes of the 
populace during this period, particularly elderly Bolivians. In line with the 
Washington Consensus policies, formal pension schemes were privatised and 
converted from pay as you go schemes to defined contribution schemes. With roughly 
12% of the Bolivian workforce employed in the formal labour market this move 
excluded a large number of the population who had no work or worked seasonally or 
on temporary contracts. The response of the government was to introduce the Bonosol 
universal social pension scheme that would provide for a transfer of state resources 
from the proceeds of capitalisation to all Bolivians who reached the age of 65, 
provided they were 21 years of age or older in 1995 (Barrientos, 2009: 3).  
The design of the scheme displayed certain shortcomings which reflect a lack of 
background research and consultation with target beneficiaries. The age whereby 
citizens could collect their Bonosol payments was 65, despite the fact that the average 
life expectancy at birth in 1997 for male and females was only 60 years of age 
(Leach, 1998: 1). In addition, indigenous communities from rural areas also tended to 
have lower life expectancy rates and were more likely to be impoverished and 
consequently, more in need of social assistance, yet many were excluded because 
they lacked the formal documentation required to claim assistance from the state in 
this period.  
 
Bolivia remains the only Latin American country to provide a non-contributory truly 
universal social pension benefit, a situation that has attracted it much attention. As 
seen previously, most governments favoured the introduction of means-tested social 
assistance schemes during the period when the New Social Policy emerged, arguing 
that with limited financial resources targeted means of assistance were more likely to 
benefit those who needed it most. However from the government‟s perspective the 
most pressing issue was the need to gain popular support, or at best the acquiescence 
of citizens, for their large-scale privatisation of public utilities and state-owned 
enterprises. It was these concerns that led to the neoliberal reformist government to 
introduce the Bonosol scheme rather than social policy considerations or the direct 
demands of civil society groups. It therefore reflected a continuation of clientelistic 
social policy measures as opposed to the participatory and empowering measures 
foreseen by the New Social Policy. 
 
The scheme was tentatively welcomed, as although it provided for the proceeds of the 
capitalisation of state-owned enterprises to be transferred to the elderly Bolivians in 
the form of an annual payment, privatisation proved to be unpopular due to concerns 
that the state was undermining the country‟s future capacity to develop. An increase 
in usage rates for utilities following privatisation also affected and angered many 
people which provoked widespread civil unrest in certain cases (Shultz & Draper, 
2008). Furthermore, grassroots organisations were disappointed with the lack of 
consultation on this important issue, particularly as the recent promulgation of the 
Ley de Participación Popular (LPP) had led to much optimism that civil society and 
popular organisations would have a greater say in the policy-making process.  
 
4.2 Popular Participation? 
The Bolivian popular participation law was an interesting and highly progressive 
piece of legislation as it sought to involve civil society and grassroots organisations in 
municipal planning and the implementation of development projects. It also provided 
for a transfer of state resources to municipalities that previously had little access to 
funds and were dependent on the generosity of the central government to fund local 
projects. Calderón and Pinc (2003: 8) suggest that the LPP came into being in large 
part as a result of the perpetual struggle of civil society organisations to be heard and 
have a say in politics however it must be also acknowledged that decentralisation was 
also an integral part of neoliberal economic policy that sought to reduce the 
cumbersome size of the state and associated central bureaucracies. 
The receipt of government funding by municipalities was supposedly dependent on 
the incorporation of civil society into decision making processes such as in the design 
of an Annual Operating Plan (AOP). Meetings were convened to provide a space for 
grassroots organisations to voice the demands and concerns of local constituents and 
influence the AOP with the objective of making local development and management 
of the municipalities‟ resources more transparent and accountable. However this did 
not always work out in practise as James Blackburn has highlighted in a paper on the 
LPP in Sucre. Blackburn‟s research on this particular case study concluded that the 
LPP did not extensively provide new opportunities for grassroots organisations to be 
empowered or involved in local planning and development as had been envisaged. 
Instead of local constituents benefiting from newly available avenues for 
participation, the traditional ruling elite and their associates managed to consolidate 
their authority and the clientelistic power-conferring arrangements that had been 
characteristic of the municipal decision-making process. Civil society organisations 
faced difficult battles in challenging the existing hierarchy as the persistence of a 
prebendal distribution of power proved quite resolute and was able to absorb 
challenges to it authority, such as the LPP supposed to do (Blackburn, 2003: 12). 
 
The results of Blackburn‟s research suggest that the aspirations of the LPP and the 
reality on the ground were often very different. This analysis is also supported by the 
observations of other commentators in relation to the objectives behind the “National 
Dialogue” process at the time when the Bonosol was been rolled out. Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith (2003: 688) point to the fact that, “civil society organisations had a 
negative experience with the „National Dialogue‟ in 1997, which the government had 
organised to elicit popular participation in policy formulation”. Thus at a crucial 
period in Bolivia‟s economic and social transformation it would appear that the 
government failed to adequately engage with civil society and incorporate their 
demands into policy design. As Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith continue,  
 
“The National Dialogue gave insufficient time to civil society 
organisations to access information and develop a response. There 
was little follow-up, fuelling suspicion and scepticism within civil 
society about the official approach to national debates on 
macroeconomic management”. 
(ibid., 688) 
On the surface, the introduction of the LPP and the creation of the National Dialgoue 
seemed to suggest a willingness of the government to listen to civil society groups 
and encourage participation amongst grassroots organisations. However as the above 
examples would seem to suggest, the reality of these developments was often far from 
what was envisaged. Indeed there appeared to be a disinclination at both the local and 
national level to truly involve grassroots organisations and allow them to participate 
in decision-making processes. The impetus for the government‟s actions would 
therefore seem to stem more from their desire to see the Bolivian state restructured 
along neoliberal policy lines. 
 
Despite the government‟s apparent reticence in genuinely engaging with civil society 
in this tumultuous period of Bolivia‟s development, the disparate nature or lack of 
cohesiveness of civil society organisations was also a factor in the lack of genuine 
participation achieved by these non-state actors. As a result of the economic crisis 
that Latin America underwent in the 1980s non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
emerged quite rapidly at a local and national level, many of which sought to siphon 
off some of the financial assistance that was been directed towards poverty relief in 
the country from abroad. Many new NGOs were set up while original grassroots 
organisations reformed themselves in the mould of development implementers and 
practitioners. Thus early civil society development in Bolivia was often characterised 
by groups seeking to compete with each other to receive funding instead of forging 
alliances with one another. Arellano-López & Petras (1994: 555) highlight this 
important distinction and argue that the emergence of NGOs as implementers of 
development assistance projects from abroad has in fact contributed to undermining 
grassroots organisations that typically represented the interests of poor and 
marginalised people at the local level.  
4.3 Laying the Foundations 
Despite the limited impact of civil society groups in the period that saw the 
introduction of the Bonosol, the first glimpse of the possibilities available for 
grassroots organisations became apparent. Acknowledging the barriers imposed by 
municipal authorities in Sucre, Blackburn also observed how previously excluded 
groups developed the capacity to petition the authorities and put pressure on them to 
respond to their demands. These actions allowed the protagonists to improve their 
negotiating skills, as well as their confidence in tabling proposals and ultimately their 
self-esteem. Even though the initial impact on local governance was extremely 
limited, the LPP opened up avenues that allowed for the participation and 
empowerment of individuals that previously they didn‟t have access to (Blackburn, 
2003: 13).  
 
The LPP also helped to promote a more inclusive democratic culture with increasing 
numbers of indigenous representatives voted into municipal office, a stark break with 
the past where indigenous communities had traditionally found themselves politically 
excluded and under-represented. Thus, these early suggestions of increased political 
representation of marginalised and disadvantaged groups would have more 
widespread impacts in the following years with many arguing that the LPP would 
contribute to the eventual transformation of the national political landscape (Calderón 
& Pinc, 2003: 9). What would emerge from the period surrounding the launch of the 
Bonosol was the increasing political activity and coherent organisation of grassroots 
organisations, social movements and other civil society groups that would be well 
placed to influence local and national politics and policies in the future. 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DE LA SOLIDARIDAD A LA DIGNIDAD 
 
This chapter will initially trace the expansion and growing capabilities of elderly 
representative groups in this period and how increased coordination and 
communication provided a strong base for these grassroots organisations to be able to 
place demands on their government. This chapter will also detail the crucial transition 
period between the Bonosol and the Renta Dignidad scheme and highlight the 
influence that grassroots participation had on the continuation and improvement of 
Boliva‟s controversial universal social pension scheme.   
 
5.1 Coordination at the Grassroots Level 
As the 1990s progressed the LPP in Bolivia was created momentum amongst 
marginalised groups that would ultimately lead to a transformation of the Bolivian 
political landscape. However the ability of civil society to participate in decision-
making processes was often quite limited due its restricted capacity and focus on the 
implementation of development projects. Many organisations that shared similar goals 
and objectives often found themselves competing against each other for financial 
assistance. In particular many elderly representative groups were quite fragmented 
due to a lack of communication, resource shortages and urban - rural divisions, a 
predicament that required a strong effort if the sector was to grow and develop. 
However in relation to the state, civil society organisations began to recognise that 
their predominantly antagonistic stance towards the state did not often achieve the 
results they wanted. As a result a more conciliatory approach manifested itself in the 
hope that improved relations would allow for greater influence in decision making 
processes at a national level (Molenears & Renard, cited in Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 
2003: 688).  
 
It was towards the end of the 1990s that an operational change in organisations 
representing elderly Bolivians can be observed. HelpAge International, a worldwide 
NGO that seeks to guarantee elderly citizens a secure, active, healthy and dignified 
old age, was instrumental in promoting the rights of elderly Bolivians and assisting 
the expansion of representative organisations. One of the main projects that HelpAge 
saw as fundamental to the healthy development of strong and representative civil 
society was its “Defendiendo los derechos de las Personas Mayores Marginadas en 
Perú y Bolivia” (Defending the Rights of Marginalised Elderly People in Peru and 
Bolivia) project. In tandem with creating awareness of the rights of elderly citizens, 
this project sought to facilitate the coordination of elderly people and strengthen 
existing representative groups. The belief was that only the struggle of elderly 
Bolivians to defend their rights themselves would facilitate a change in attitude from 
the state towards this marginalised sector of society and ensure significant changes in 
the orientation of public policies. 
 
In the 1990s HelpAge facilitated the creation and day-to-day running of “Defence of 
the Elderly” organisations in various Bolivian cities which functioned both as forums 
for grassroots participation and as NGOs dedicated to the issues and problems that 
surround old-age. Another output of the HelpAge project in this period was the 
creation of two dedicated civil society groups that worked extensively together on the 
problems faced by elderly Bolivians throughout the country; the Centro de 
Orientación Sociolegal de La Paz y El Alto (COSL) and Fundación Horizontes. These 
NGOs made important advancements in providing opportunities for elderly Bolivians 
to organise together and disseminate information regarding the rights of elderly 
citizens. Following the initial support from HelpAge, these organisations would 
become independently managed but they retained close relations which would help 
the undertaking of future endeavours together. Another important development in this 
period was the foundation of the Asociación Nacional del Adulto Mayor de Bolivia 
(ANAMBO). The organisation was the brainchild of COSL and Fundación Horizontes 
and was conceived with a view to becoming the principal network for disparate 
elderly representative groups in the country and a point of reference for further 
interaction between government authorities and grassroots organisations. 
 
5.2 Expanding the Opportunities for Participation and 
Empowerment 
One of the main objectives of ANAMBO was assist the integration of various elderly 
groups, with particular regard to the incorporation of grassroots organisations in rural 
areas that had been traditionally excluded due to geographical and socioeconomic 
factors. For the most part, elderly Bolivians living in rural areas were more likely to 
be poorer than their urban counterparts and consequently more in need of state social 
assistance (Romero, 2005: 2) - apparently only 1 per cent of the rural elderly live 
above the poverty line in Bolivia (Bauer & Bowen, cited in Müller, 2009: 168). 
Before the genesis of ANAMBO there had only been two small rural networks that 
worked with elderly people, a situation that greatly restricted their ability to have their 
voices heard outside the areas they operated in. Furthermore the dirigentes (leaders) 
of these groups mainly came from urban areas and so they were often unable to 
identify with the rural elderly citizens that they were supposed to represent. Even 
ANAMBO‟s member base in its early days was predominantly made up of elderly in 
urban areas who were in receipt of a formal pension. However following the drive of 
ANAMBO to promote greater inclusion and participation amongst elderly Bolivians 
in rural areas, there now exist six coordinated rural networks with representatives 
mainly drawn from rural backgrounds. The accomplishment of ANAMBO in 
providing authentic representation to a variety of grassroots organisations and 
previously excluded rural citizens has been considered its greatest achievement 
(Molina, 2009: 6). This strategy would have particularly important consequences for 
its future capacity to present a unified national front when campaigning for better 
social assistance from the state in the form of La Renta Dignidad. 
 
For the past few years the elderly „movement‟ in Perú and Bolivia 
has fought to earn greater attention from national authorities, 
intermediaries and local actors. Not only has the movement 
succeeded in earning greater social assistance provisions but it has 
also been able to influence polices and sustainable programmes that 
respect the rights of the elderly. 
 
(Molina, 2009: 7, Author’s translation1) 
 
 
 
One of the main tools employed by ANAMBO to empower individuals was the 
promotion of social-legal rights. Through training assistance, dissemination of 
publications and localised meetings ANAMBO, in partnership with COSL, was able 
to create widespread awareness amongst elderly Bolivians of their rights and 
entitlements. Consequently through these efforts the leadership of ANAMBO were 
able to garner grassroots support for their wider objectives of “participation in the 
elaboration and formulation of policies and programmes for elderly citizens” and 
“advocacy for measures of protection and defence of elderly people” (ANAMBO, 
                                                 
1
 Original quote; El movimiento de personas mayores de Perú y Bolivia ha luchado en los últimos años 
para lograr una mayor atención de las autoridades nacionales, intermedias y locales. No solamente ha 
hecho exigencias que podríamos llamar “asistencialistas”, sino también ha exigido la aprobación de 
políticas y programas sostenibles de promoción y cumplimiento de los derechos de las personas de 
edad. 
 
2009). The use of human rights in the achievement of these goals was significant as it 
allowed for the empowerment of participants by making them key activists in this 
process. Campaigning on a national level ANAMBO‟s presence greatly contributed to 
the promulgation of the Law 3323 which legislates that municipal governments must 
provide free medical attention to all Bolivians over the age of 60. In addition, 
ANAMBO are currently campaigning for a “Ley del Adulto Mayor” (Elderly Citizen 
Law) which seeks to guarantee the participation of, and consultation with, elderly 
representative groups and elderly sector specialists in the formulation of policy. One 
of ANAMBO‟s most crucial successes to date though has been its positive influence 
in the transformation of Bolivia‟s universal social pension scheme, which the current 
government expanded and improved significantly in 2007 (Molina, 2009: 7; Miranda, 
2009). 
 
5.3 De la Solidaridad a la Dignidad 
As mentioned previously, concerns over the financial sustainability of the Bonosol 
plagued the scheme following its introduction in 1997. These concerns would 
ultimately lead the administration of Hugo Banzer to discontinue the Bonosol in 
January 1998, only to replace it with a less generous and extensive benefit scheme 
named Bolivida, which began paying out in 2000. The decision proved unpopular 
with many whose livelihoods were dependent on the receipt of state assistance and the 
return to power of Sánchez de Lozada in 2002 saw the re-introduction of the Bonosol 
and the original payment of 1,800 bolivianos to over-65s (Müller, 2009: 166). The 
Bonosol remained in service until the arrival to power of the MAS administration 
under Evo Morales. However the re-nationalisation by MAS of the hydrocarbons 
companies and other industries privatised in the 1990s essentially eroded the financial 
base of the FCC which had been used to finance Bonosol payments and initially the 
government struggled to find alternative sources of funding (ibid.: 169) By early 2007 
it became clear that the Bonosol was in financial difficulty and lacking political and 
popular support. However this development became the impetus that helped mobilise 
elderly Bolivians to demand continued state social assistance from their government. 
 
ANAMBO played a particularly influential role in lobbying the government during 
this crucial transition period from the Bonosol to the Renta Dignidad scheme in 2007. 
One of the main reasons that allowed ANAMBO to have such an influential role in 
this process was the unified platform and the strong mandate conferred on them by 
grassroots organisations and elderly citizens from around the country. Vitally, the 
ability of ANAMBO‟s to draw on grassroots support from urban and rural areas in 
distinct municipalities and socio-economic groups around the country made this into a 
national issue, and consequently, an issue that would be difficult for the government 
to ignore (Miranda, 2009). Compared to previous state-civil society engagements 
where voices were often fragmented, ANAMBO and it associates possessed a strong 
and united leadership who reflected the needs and demands of ordinary citizens, 
ultimately allowing them to campaign with a degree of legitimacy and confidence.  
 
Observing these developments, organisations such as Fundación Horizontes also 
provided further support through the capacity building and training of ANAMBO 
dirigentes in advocacy and negotiating skills (ibid.: 2009). The popular support 
enjoyed by ANAMBO and the importance of the social pension scheme was 
displayed by a series of marches in the capital in August and October 2007. Roughly 
8,000 – 10,000 supporters and concerned citizens took to the streets in a traditionally 
popular and effective method of grassroots activism – protest marches. The two 
marches took place in La Paz and they made their way to the Plaza Murillo where the 
seat of government is located. The strong support and participation on show to 
government officials demonstrated the importance of Bolivia‟s universal social 
pension scheme in no uncertain terms – the threat of protest marches and bloqueos 
that would often bring the country‟s transport system to a standstill were sagely 
acknowledged by the government, many of whom had participated in similar forms of 
protest themselves in recent times (BBC Mundo, 2002) 
 
At this time there existed few official channels for civil society to be involved in 
policy formulation and so campaigning had to be dome through autonomous actions 
such as protests and unofficial lobbying. The MAS administration had created the 
Viceminesterio De Coordinación con los Movimientos Sociales Y La Sociedad Civil 
(Vice-Ministry for the Coordination of Social Movements and Civil Society) after 
entering office which sought to improve the opportunities available for 
communication and consultation between the government and civil society actors 
although as a relatively new public body it would require a „bedding in‟ period before 
effective relations were created.  
 
Under pressure from civil society groups the MAS administration were forced to 
consider the feasibility of financing the universal pension scheme from different 
sources during this period. Their inability to formulate a coherent response and 
directly answer protestors and elderly representative groups led to the dirigentes of 
ANAMBO requesting a consultation session with the government, with the result that 
grassroots representatives from ANAMBO were invited to voice their demands 
directly to government officials (ibid.: 2009). The creation of this government body 
and the acquiescence of the government to meet with dirigentes displayed a 
willingness on behalf of officials to listen to civil society and improve state-society 
relations. This contrasts strongly with previous administrations which were mainly 
staffed by technocrats who did not see the benefit of consultation or have the 
necessary skills available to do so. The opportunity for direct consultation was an 
unusual one but it displayed the significance of the situation for the government and 
so they allowed the dirigentes to place their demands on the table; that the Bonosol 
would not be discontinued and that every elderly Bolivian would have their right to 
receive adequate state social assistance in the form of a financial benefit enshrined 
(ibid.: 2009).  
 
The response of the MAS government in late 2007 was significant. The Bonosol was 
replaced with the Renta Dignidad scheme which continued the non-contributory 
nature of the scheme yet expanded it in various ways. The age of qualification to 
receive payments was lowered from 65 to 60 and the restriction of the Bonosol 
scheme to citizens born before 1975 was dropped – making the scheme open-ended 
and truly universal. Furthermore the annual payment was increased from 1,800 
Bolivianos (currently US$258) to 2,400 Bolivianos (currently US$344). The scheme 
could also be collected monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or annually depending on 
the needs of beneficiaries, while those already in receipt of a formal pension received 
75% of the total amount. The scheme was to be funded by the increase in tax revenues 
that the government had earned from the re-nationalisation of the hydrocarbons 
industry – 30% of this source of income went towards financing La Renta Dignidad 
which was expected to need roughly US$205 million yearly to maintain payments. 
One final development for elderly Bolivians was the inclusion of the Renta Dignidad 
social pension benefit in the new Constitution which was ratified in January 2009. 
Article 67 now guarantees the provision of a social assistance by the Bolivian state to 
the elderly as well as basic human rights which was a particular focus of ANAMBO 
through its focus on defending the rights of elderly citizens in Bolivia. Article 68 also 
behooves the Bolivian state to adopt public policies for the protection, recreation and 
social assistance of elderly Bolivians. 
 
5.4 The Catalysts for Change 
In comparison with other forms of state social assistance in the region, Bolivia‟s non-
contributory social pension scheme was already quite generous before its 
transformation to the Renta Dignidad. Therefore the decision of the MAS 
administration to greatly expand the scheme is an intriguing development that cannot 
be contemplated by political or economic considerations alone. From an economic 
standpoint, the FCC that had financed the original Bonosol scheme was exhausted and 
could not continue paying out. However the decision of the MAS administration to 
increase the amount received by beneficiaries and remove conditionalities on who 
qualified for assistance increased the annual cost of funding to approximately US 
$205 million which is a considerable outlay for one of the poorest countries in Latin 
America. It would appear then that macroeconomic constraints or fiscal concerns did 
not impact as heavily on the MAS administration as they did the neoliberal reformist 
government of Sánchez de Lozada.  
 
Other observers have suggested that electoral considerations were one of the main 
reasons behind the government‟s decision to expand and improve the social pension 
benefit and this cannot be discounted outright. As has been observed from social 
policy design and implementation in the past, clientelism and rentier politics have 
played an important role in influencing social policy assistance in the region. 
However by their nature universal forms of social assistance purport to include all 
citizens and exclude none. Indeed by making La Renta Dignidad truly universal and 
including citizens already in receipt of a formal pension shows that the government 
actively took strides to prevent the scheme been construed as a reward for the 
grassroots supporters with whom they had close relations. Furthermore the MAS 
administration have confirmed their intentions to invest in the social development of 
Bolivians as shown by other social policy measures such as the Juancito Pinto, which 
seeks to encourage access to education for children through a transfer from the state, 
and more recently, the Juana Azurduy mother-child subsidy to improve maternal and 
child mortality in the country. 
 
The political opportunity presented by the Renta Dignidad was certainly not missed 
by the MAS administration as they realised that a re-branding of the scheme would fit 
quite well with their overall political designs. By symbolically discontinuing the 
Bonosol which was considered a neo-liberal project, Morales branded the new and 
improved Renta Dignidad with the developmentalist stamp thus strengthening the 
ideological rejection of neoliberal policy that the MAS so strived for. In addition, to 
finance the scheme the amount of revenue distributed to municipalities was to 
decrease which caused widespread consternation and led to many protests against the 
central government, particularly in the eastern provinces. This led certain 
commentators to view the Renta Dignidad as a political project intended to win the 
government‟s power struggle with opposition governors and prefectures (León, cited 
in Muller, 169). The fact that the scheme was rushed through parliament with very 
little consensus building would give strength to this argument. Although the Renta 
Dignidad could be construed as an attempt by the government to weaken opposition 
groups by reducing the IDH income received by municipalities, the decision to 
improve and expand the benefit can not be solely explained by political divisions and 
animosities.  
The MAS administration could have addressed any economic concerns or achieved 
their political and electoral goals by simply re-branding the scheme in their own name 
and continuing the entitlements offered by the Bonosol, a move that would have 
certainly earned support from the general populace and elderly representative groups. 
With this in mind the decision to increase the payment transfer to elderly citizens and 
reduce the age of qualification were important advancements, whose original impetus 
can be seen to be derived from grassroots pressure below. As detailed above, 
organisations such as ANAMBO had been expanding their support base and 
campaigning the government for some time to demand increased protection for 
Bolivians in their old-age. Despite the lack of official channels for participation and 
consultation the representatives of elderly groups still managed to make their voices 
heard and listened to.  
 
The impact and influence of civil society groups and grassroots organisations can 
therefore be seen as influential in the continuation and improvement of Bolivia‟s 
universal pension scheme. Political and economic concerns, although important, were 
not as much of a catalyst in this process as the pressures exerted by elderly Bolivians 
and their representatives from below. The participation of elderly Bolivians in the 
strategies of grassroots organisations and their consequent empowerment through the 
demands they placed on the government through representatives was a significant 
change from social policy formulation in the past and may provide an example for 
marginalised and disadvantaged groups throughout Latin America to replicate. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The impetus behind this paper was to analyse the role played by grassroots actors in 
the continuation of Bolivia‟s highly controversial social pension scheme to see if a 
shift to a more bottom-up approach to social policy design could be observed. To 
begin with the paper highlighted how social policy in Latin America has typically 
been designed in a top-down and clientelistic manner for much of the twentieth 
century. The paper also showed how the macroeconomic restructuring that Bolivia 
underwent had profound negative effects on vulnerable sectors of society to the extent 
that there emerged a new commitment to poverty alleviation and state social 
assistance.  
 
The New Social Policy that emerged in the aftermath of the „lost decade‟ was strongly 
influenced by the concepts of participation and rights and there was a hope that this 
could lead to a more inclusive framework for policy formulation in the region. On the 
ground the New Social Policy manifested itself in means-tested forms of targeted 
social assistance in most Latin American countries. Following on from this the paper 
observed how the introduction of the Bonosol universal social pension benefit in 
Bolivia went against dominant trends elsewhere and how it was not motivated by 
social policy considerations. Despite the promulgation of the Popular Participation 
Law there was minimal interaction or consultation with grassroots organisations in 
this period and civil society remained fragmented. 
 
The research then traced the development of grassroots participation at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century and detailed how the strengthening of alliances between 
disparate elderly groups was greatly facilitated by the presence of ANAMBO and 
partner organisations. This strong affiliation between various non-state actors greatly 
empowered these groups to campaign vociferously at a national level. Finally the 
paper showed how the influence of these groups and the demands they placed on the 
government were instrumental in forcing the MAS administration to concretely 
address the problem of old-age poverty, insecurity and indignity in Bolivia and 
introduce a more expansive and generous form of social assistance for all elderly 
Bolivians. 
 
This research has shown how grassroots participation was influential in the 
continuation and improvement of what is a controversial but very necessary measure 
of state social assistance in Bolivia. Despite a history of marginalisation and exclusion 
elderly citizens were able to coordinate their actions and form a unified voice that 
became difficult for an accountable and representative government to ignore. This is 
an interesting development and may provide an example for grassroots organisations 
throughout Latin America to follow.  
 
Despite the emergence of the New Social Policy and a focus on targeted assistance 
there are relatively few examples where indigent or disadvantaged sectors of society 
have been able to influence policy design as in many cases technical and professional 
advisors still dictate the policy-making process in many Latin American countries. 
Events in Bolivia show that the involvement of beneficiaries in bottom-up policy 
design can have desirable results as it allows for beneficiaries to articulate their 
demands and needs and therefore receive adequate assistance that can help protect 
them from further impoverishment, a situation that challenges the traditionally 
clientelistic and top-down methods of social policy-making in Latin America. 
 
However the development of formal avenues for consultation and participation are 
needed for grassroots participation to become a lasting and truly beneficial feature of 
social policy design and democratic representation throughout Bolivia and Latin 
America. A willingness to listen by the government is also a vital ingredient for 
success, as is the desire of citizens to participate. The current MAS administration has 
begun to address this issue with the creation of the Viceminesterio De Coordinación 
con los Movimientos Sociales Y La Sociedad Civil to help facilitate interaction 
between the state and civil society and this is a welcome development. Official 
channels for participation would also help ensure that social policy formulation does 
not succumb to clientelistic pressures and that all citizens can have a say in policy 
design irrespective of their political and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
 
 
__________________________________ 
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